Universität zu Köln

Trampusch, Christine ORCID: 0000-0003-1024-2065 and Gross, Philip (2021). Do parliaments have control over sovereign debt management? West European Politics, 44 (2). pp. 299-326. ABINGDON: ROUTLEDGE JOURNALS, TAYLOR & FRANCIS LTD. ISSN 1743-9655

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Abstract

Sovereign debt management (SDM) requires decisions about the composition and structure of central government debt. Nowadays the process is delegated to professional debt management offices (DMOs), which use complex financial instruments and resort to capital markets. Parliaments in some countries have expressed concern over losing control of SDM. This article devises two indices to measure parliamentary control over SDM and DMOs' implementation flexibility. It applies both indices to original data from 17 OECD countries. The article finds that parliaments' legal authority over SDM and rights to information pertaining to it relate to their general power as well as economic and SDM financialisation. There is no trade-off between parliamentary strength and DMOs' flexibility in operational decisions. These findings are of interest for research on parliamentary power, financialisation and delegation. To draw causal inferences from these associations more research is needed on the timing, politics and consequences of institutional change towards professional DMOs.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Trampusch, Christine UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0003-1024-2065 UNSPECIFIED Gross, Philip UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-130223
DOI:	10.1080/01402382.2019.1680513
Journal or Publication Title:	West European Politics
Volume:	44
Number:	2
Page Range:	pp. 299-326
Date:	2021
Publisher:	ROUTLEDGE JOURNALS, TAYLOR & FRANCIS LTD
Place of Publication:	ABINGDON
ISSN:	1743-9655
Language:	English
Faculty:	Faculty of Management, Economy and Social Sciences
Divisions:	Faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences > Social Sciences > Political Science > Cologne Center for Comparative Politics
Subjects:	Social sciences Political science Public administration
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language REGULATORY AGENCIES; REFORMS; FINANCIALISATION; GOVERNMENTS; AUTONOMY; MARKETS; EUROPE; POWER Multiple languages Political Science Multiple languages
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/13022