Universität zu Köln

Sauermann, Jan ORCID: 0000-0002-7673-6407 and Beckmann, Paul (2019). The influence of group size on distributional fairness under voting by veto. Eur. J. Polit. Econ., 56. S. 90 - 103. NEW YORK: ELSEVIER SCIENCE INC. ISSN 1873-5703

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Abstract

Voting by Veto [VBV], developed by Dennis C. Mueller, is a two-stage voting mechanism for committee decision making. In the first stage, every member of the committee makes a proposal. The proposals are joined with the current status quo (or another fallback option). For the second stage, a random mechanism determines the order of voting and the committee members sequentially eliminate one alternative each. After every committee member has exercised her veto, a single winning alternative remains. Game theory predicts that the equality of the resulting distribution under VBV varies with group size. Hence, decisions in two-member groups should result in highly unequal distributions of benefits. With increasing group size, however, VBV should generate more equally distributed outcomes. We examine the effect of group size under VBV in a series of laboratory experiments where groups with a varying number of members play a 'divide the dollar game'. Our results confirm that larger groups choose more equal distributions than smaller groups. However, we also find deviations from the model's predictions. Some committees in our experiment do not select Pareto-optimal alternatives. An exploratory analysis of possible explanations suggests that individual behavior is most likely motivated by a combination of material self-interest and social preferences such as reciprocity and fairness.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Sauermann, Jan UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0002-7673-6407 UNSPECIFIED Beckmann, Paul UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-160919
DOI:	10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2018.07.008
Journal or Publication Title:	Eur. J. Polit. Econ.
Volume:	56
Page Range:	S. 90 - 103
Date:	2019
Publisher:	ELSEVIER SCIENCE INC
Place of Publication:	NEW YORK
ISSN:	1873-5703
Language:	English
Faculty:	Unspecified
Divisions:	Unspecified
Subjects:	no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language SELF-INTEREST; MAJORITARIAN Multiple languages Economics; Political Science Multiple languages
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/16091