Universität zu Köln

Ehlers, Lars and Westkamp, Alexander ORCID: 0000-0001-6892-1189 (2018). Strategy-proof tie-breaking in matching with priorities. Theor. Econ., 13 (3). S. 1009 - 1042. NEW YORK: ECONOMETRIC SOCIETY. ISSN 1555-7561

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Abstract

A set of indivisible objects is allocated among agents with strict preferences. Each object has a weak priority ranking of the agents. A collection of priority rankings, a priority structure, is solvable if there is a strategy-proof mechanism that is constrained efficient, i.e., that always produces a stable matching that is not Pareto-dominated by another stable matching. We characterize all solvable priority structures satisfying the following two restrictions: Either there are no ties or there is at least one four-way tie.For any two agents i and j, if there is an object that assigns higher priority to i than to j, there is also an object that assigns higher priority to j than to i.(A)(B) We show that there are at most three types of solvable priority structures: The strict type, the house allocation with existing tenants (HET) type, where, for each object, there is at most one agent who has strictly higher priority than another agent, and the task allocation with unqualified agents (TAU) type, where, for each object, there is at most one agent who has strictly lower priority than another agent. Out of these three, only HET priority structures are shown to admit a strongly group-strategy-proof and constrained efficient mechanism.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Ehlers, Lars UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Westkamp, Alexander UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0001-6892-1189 UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-174136
DOI:	10.3982/TE2547
Journal or Publication Title:	Theor. Econ.
Volume:	13
Number:	3
Page Range:	S. 1009 - 1042
Date:	2018
Publisher:	ECONOMETRIC SOCIETY
Place of Publication:	NEW YORK
ISSN:	1555-7561
Language:	English
Faculty:	Faculty of Management, Economy and Social Sciences
Divisions:	Center of Excellence C-SEB
Subjects:	Economics
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language ASSIGNMENT PROBLEM; INDIVISIBLE GOODS; SCHOOL CHOICE; ALLOCATION; STABILITY; EXCHANGE; EFFICIENCY; MARKET Multiple languages Economics Multiple languages
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/17413