Universität zu Köln

Ahn, T. K., Loukas, Balafoutas, Batsaikhan, Mongoljin ORCID: 0000-0001-9357-2021, Campos-Ortiz, Francisco, Putterman, Louis and Sutter, Matthias ORCID: 0000-0002-6143-8706 (2018). Trust and communication in a property rights dilemma. J. Econ. Behav. Organ., 149. S. 413 - 434. AMSTERDAM: ELSEVIER. ISSN 1879-1751

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Abstract

We study in five diverse countries a laboratory social dilemma game in which incentives to steal from others lead to the socially inefficient diversion of resources from production unless the members of a given mini-society can abide by norms of non-theft or engage in low cost collective protection of their members' wealth accumulations. We compare two treatments in which subjects have opportunities to exchange free-form messages to one without such opportunities, finding that most subjects allocate far less to theft and most groups achieve much greater efficiency in the presence of communication. Ease of identifying who has engaged in theft varies across the two communication treatments, but is of minor importance to the outcome. We find several coding-amenable elements of message content to be statistically significant predictors of group and individual outcomes. Contributing to the literature on culture, norms, and preferences, we find that the degree to which communication fosters cooperation varies among countries in a manner correlated with variation in survey based trust and with desistance from theft at the outset of our communication-free experiment treatment. (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Ahn, T. K. UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Loukas, Balafoutas UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Batsaikhan, Mongoljin UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0001-9357-2021 UNSPECIFIED Campos-Ortiz, Francisco UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Putterman, Louis UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Sutter, Matthias UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0002-6143-8706 UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-187006
DOI:	10.1016/j.jebo.2018.01.009
Journal or Publication Title:	J. Econ. Behav. Organ.
Volume:	149
Page Range:	S. 413 - 434
Date:	2018
Publisher:	ELSEVIER
Place of Publication:	AMSTERDAM
ISSN:	1879-1751
Language:	English
Faculty:	Unspecified
Divisions:	Unspecified
Subjects:	no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language SOCIAL PREFERENCES; PROMISES; COOPERATION; PUNISHMENT; GOVERNANCE; ANARCHY Multiple languages Economics Multiple languages
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/18700