Universität zu Köln

Ranalli, Chris (2018). Revisionism, Scepticism, and the Non-Belief Theory of Hinge Commitments. Int. J. Study Skept., 8 (2). S. 96 - 131. LEIDEN: BRILL. ISSN 2210-5700

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Abstract

In his recent work, Duncan Pritchard defends a novel Wittgensteinian response to the problem of radical scepticism. The response makes essential use of a form of non-epistemicism about the nature of hinge commitments. According to non-epistemicism, hinge commitments cannot be known or grounded in rational considerations, such as reasons and evidence. On Pritchard's version of non-epistemicism, hinge commitments express propositions but cannot be believed. This is the non-belief theory of hinge commitments (NBT). One of the main reasons in favour of NBT over rival anti-sceptical Wittgensteinian views is that it has less theoretical costs and revisionary consequences than its rivals. In this paper, I argue that NBT fares at least as bad as its rivals in terms of its theoretical costs and revisionism. In particular, I argue that NBT is inconsistent with certain cases of philosophical disagreement; that it faces worries with mental-state scepticism; and that it faces difficulties in explaining how we can represent ourselves as committed to hinge commitments.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Ranalli, Chris UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-202570
DOI:	10.1163/22105700-20171272
Journal or Publication Title:	Int. J. Study Skept.
Volume:	8
Number:	2
Page Range:	S. 96 - 131
Date:	2018
Publisher:	BRILL
Place of Publication:	LEIDEN
ISSN:	2210-5700
Language:	English
Faculty:	Unspecified
Divisions:	Unspecified
Subjects:	no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language CONCEIVABILITY; CHALLENGE; ONTOLOGY Multiple languages Philosophy Multiple languages
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/20257