Universität zu Köln

Berens, Sarah and von Schiller, Armin ORCID: 0000-0001-5172-8227 (2017). Taxing Higher Incomes: What Makes the High-Income Earners Consent to More Progressive Taxation in Latin America? Polit. Behav., 39 (3). S. 703 - 730. NEW YORK: SPRINGER/PLENUM PUBLISHERS. ISSN 1573-6687

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Abstract

When do high-income earners get 'on board' with the fiscal contract and accept paying a larger share of the tax burden? Progressive taxes perform particularly poorly in developing countries. We argue that the common opposition of the affluent to more progressive taxation is not merely connected to administrative limitations to coercively enforce compliance, but also to the uncertainty that high-income earners associate with the returns to taxes. Because coercion is not an option, there is a need to convince high-income earners to 'invest' in the public system via taxes. Trust in institutions is decisive for the fiscal contract. Expecting that paid contributions will be used in a sensible manner, high-income earners will be more supportive of progressive income taxation. We study tax composition preferences of a cross-section of Latin American countries using public opinion data from LAPOP for 2012. Findings reveal that higher levels of trust in political institutions strongly mitigate the opposition of the affluent towards more progressive taxation.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Berens, Sarah UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED von Schiller, Armin UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0001-5172-8227 UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-221165
DOI:	10.1007/s11109-016-9376-2
Journal or Publication Title:	Polit. Behav.
Volume:	39
Number:	3
Page Range:	S. 703 - 730
Date:	2017
Publisher:	SPRINGER/PLENUM PUBLISHERS
Place of Publication:	NEW YORK
ISSN:	1573-6687
Language:	English
Faculty:	Unspecified
Divisions:	Unspecified
Subjects:	no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language REDISTRIBUTION; INEQUALITY; INSTITUTIONS; PREFERENCES; STRATEGIES; GOVERNMENT; EQUALITY; SIZE Multiple languages Political Science Multiple languages
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/22116