Universität zu Köln

Sliwka, Dirk ORCID: 0000-0002-8026-0165 and Werner, Peter (2017). Wage Increases and the Dynamics of Reciprocity. J. Labor Econ., 35 (2). S. 299 - 345. CHICAGO: UNIV CHICAGO PRESS. ISSN 1537-5307

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Abstract

We investigate how workers' performance is affected by the timing of wages in a real-effort experiment. In all treatments, agents earn the same wage sum, but wage increases are distributed differently over time. We find that agents work harder under increasing wage profiles if they do not know these profiles in advance. A profile that continuously increases wages by small amounts raises performance by about 15% relative to a constant wage. The effort reactions can be organized by a model in which agents reciprocally respond to wage impulses, comparing wages to an adaptive reference standard determined by the previous wage.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Sliwka, Dirk UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0002-8026-0165 UNSPECIFIED Werner, Peter UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-235627
DOI:	10.1086/689189
Journal or Publication Title:	J. Labor Econ.
Volume:	35
Number:	2
Page Range:	S. 299 - 345
Date:	2017
Publisher:	UNIV CHICAGO PRESS
Place of Publication:	CHICAGO
ISSN:	1537-5307
Language:	English
Faculty:	Faculty of Management, Economy and Social Sciences
Divisions:	Center of Excellence C-SEB Faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences > Business Administration > Corporate Development > Professorship for Business Administration and Human Resources Management
Subjects:	Economics
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language RELATIONAL CONTRACTS; LABOR CONTRACTS; GIFT EXCHANGE; FIELD; COMPETITION; FAIRNESS; WORK; CHOICE; MARKET; PREFERENCES Multiple languages Economics; Industrial Relations & Labor Multiple languages
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/23562