Universität zu Köln

Bierbrauer, Felix ORCID: 0000-0003-3879-9607 and Hellwig, Martin F. (2016). Robustly Coalition-Proof Incentive Mechanisms for Public Good Provision are Voting Mechanisms and Vice Versa. Rev. Econ. Stud., 83 (4). S. 1440 - 1465. OXFORD: OXFORD UNIV PRESS. ISSN 1467-937X

Full text not available from this repository.

Abstract

We study the relation between mechanism design and voting in public good provision. If incentive mechanisms must satisfy conditions of robust coalition-proofness as well as robust incentive compatibility, the participants' contributions to public good provision can only depend on the level of the public good that is provided and that level can only depend on the population shares of people favouring one level over another. For a public good that comes as a single indivisible unit the outcome depends on whether or not the share of votes in favour of provision exceeds a specified threshold. With more provision levels for the public good, more complicated mechanisms can be used but they still involve the counting of votes rather than any measurement of the participants' willingness to pay. The article thus provides a foundation for the use of voting mechanisms.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Bierbrauer, Felix UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0003-3879-9607 UNSPECIFIED Hellwig, Martin F. UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-260255
DOI:	10.1093/restud/rdw015
Journal or Publication Title:	Rev. Econ. Stud.
Volume:	83
Number:	4
Page Range:	S. 1440 - 1465
Date:	2016
Publisher:	OXFORD UNIV PRESS
Place of Publication:	OXFORD
ISSN:	1467-937X
Language:	English
Faculty:	Faculty of Management, Economy and Social Sciences
Divisions:	Center of Excellence C-SEB Faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences > Economics > Macroeconomic, Financial and Economic Policy > Professorship for Macroeconomic
Subjects:	Economics
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION; INCOMPLETE INFORMATION; INCOME TAXATION; COMPATIBILITY; DESIGN; IMPLEMENTATION; COLLUSION; UNCERTAINTY; SCHEMES; RULES Multiple languages Economics Multiple languages
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/26025