Universität zu Köln

Grundmann, Thomas (2015). How reliabilism saves the apriori/aposteriori distinction. Synthese, 192 (9). S. 2747 - 2769. DORDRECHT: SPRINGER. ISSN 1573-0964

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Abstract

Contemporary epistemologists typically define a priori justification as justification that is independent of sense experience. However, sense experience plays at least some role in the production of many paradigm cases of a priori justified belief. This raises the question of when experience is epistemically relevant to the justificatory status of the belief that is based on it. In this paper, I will outline the answers that can be given by the two currently dominant accounts of justification, i.e. evidentialism and reliabilism. While for the evidentialist, experience is epistemically relevant only if it is used as evidence, the reliabilist requires that the reliability of the relevant process depends on the reliability of experiential processes. I will argue that the reliabilist account accommodates our pre-theoretic classifications much better. In the final part of my paper I will use the reliabilist criterion to defend the a priori-a posteriori distinction against recent challenges by Hawthorne and Williamson.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Grundmann, Thomas UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-391311
DOI:	10.1007/s11229-014-0422-5
Journal or Publication Title:	Synthese
Volume:	192
Number:	9
Page Range:	S. 2747 - 2769
Date:	2015
Publisher:	SPRINGER
Place of Publication:	DORDRECHT
ISSN:	1573-0964
Language:	English
Faculty:	Faculty of Arts and Humanities
Divisions:	Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Fächergruppe 8: Philosophie > Philosophisches Seminar
Subjects:	no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language A-PRIORI KNOWLEDGE; MEMORY Multiple languages History & Philosophy Of Science; Philosophy Multiple languages
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/39131