Universität zu Köln

Khalmetski, Kiryl, Ockenfels, Axel ORCID: 0000-0003-1456-0191 and Werner, Peter (2015). Surprising gifts: Theory and laboratory evidence. J. Econ. Theory, 159. S. 163 - 209. SAN DIEGO: ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE. ISSN 1095-7235

Full text not available from this repository.

Abstract

People do not only feel guilt from not living up to others' expectations (Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2007), but may also like to exceed them. We propose a model that generalizes the guilt aversion model to capture the possibility of positive surprises when making gifts. A model extension allows decision makers to care about others' attribution of intentions behind surprises. We test the model in a series of dictator game experiments. We find a strong causal effect of recipients' expectations on dictators' transfers. Moreover, in line with our model, the correlation between transfers and expectations can be both positive and negative, obscuring the effect in the aggregate. Finally, we provide evidence that dictators care about what recipients know about the intentions behind surprises. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Khalmetski, Kiryl UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Ockenfels, Axel UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0003-1456-0191 UNSPECIFIED Werner, Peter UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-394041
DOI:	10.1016/j.jet.2015.05.008
Journal or Publication Title:	J. Econ. Theory
Volume:	159
Page Range:	S. 163 - 209
Date:	2015
Publisher:	ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE
Place of Publication:	SAN DIEGO
ISSN:	1095-7235
Language:	English
Faculty:	Faculty of Management, Economy and Social Sciences
Divisions:	Faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences > Economics > Macroeconomic, Financial and Economic Policy > Professur für Economics, Design and Behavior Center of Excellence C-SEB
Subjects:	Economics
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language INCOMPLETE INFORMATION; COMPARATIVE STATICS; EMOTIONAL-REACTIONS; PROSPECT-THEORY; HIDDEN COSTS; PROMISES; BELIEFS; GAMES; COMPETITION; DECISION Multiple languages Economics Multiple languages
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/39404