Universität zu Köln

Ockenfels, Axel ORCID: 0000-0003-1456-0191 and Selten, Reinhard (2014). Impulse balance in the newsvendor game. Games Econ. Behav., 86. S. 237 - 248. SAN DIEGO: ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE. ISSN 1090-2473

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Abstract

One striking behavioral phenomenon is the pull-to-center bias in the newsvendor game: facing stochastic demand, subjects tend to order quantities between the expected profit maximizing quantity and mean demand. We show that the impulse balance equilibrium, which is based on a simple ex-post rationality principle along with an equilibrium condition, predicts the pull-to-center bias and other, more subtle observations in the laboratory newsvendor game. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Ockenfels, Axel UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0003-1456-0191 UNSPECIFIED Selten, Reinhard UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-434483
DOI:	10.1016/j.geb.2014.03.012
Journal or Publication Title:	Games Econ. Behav.
Volume:	86
Page Range:	S. 237 - 248
Date:	2014
Publisher:	ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE
Place of Publication:	SAN DIEGO
ISSN:	1090-2473
Language:	English
Faculty:	Faculty of Management, Economy and Social Sciences
Divisions:	Faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences > Economics > Macroeconomic, Financial and Economic Policy > Professur für Economics, Design and Behavior Center of Excellence C-SEB
Subjects:	no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language STATIONARY CONCEPTS; BOUNDED RATIONALITY; DECISION-MAKING; PROSPECT-THEORY; MODELS; EQUILIBRIUM; FEEDBACK; BEHAVIOR Multiple languages Economics Multiple languages
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/43448