Goldluecke, Susanne and Schmitz, Patrick W. (2014). Investments as signals of outside options. J. Econ. Theory, 150. S. 683 - 709. SAN DIEGO: ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE. ISSN 1095-7235
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
Consider a seller who can make an observable but non-contractible investment to improve an intermediate good that is specialized to a particular buyer's needs. The buyer then makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the seller. The seller has private information about the fraction of the ex post surplus that he can realize on his own. Compared to a situation with complete information, additional investment incentives are generated by the seller's desire to pretend a strong outside option. On the other hand, ex post efficiency is not attained since asymmetric information at the bargaining stage sometimes leads to inefficient separations. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Item Type: | Journal Article | ||||||||||||
Creators: |
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URN: | urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-444425 | ||||||||||||
DOI: | 10.1016/j.jet.2013.12.001 | ||||||||||||
Journal or Publication Title: | J. Econ. Theory | ||||||||||||
Volume: | 150 | ||||||||||||
Page Range: | S. 683 - 709 | ||||||||||||
Date: | 2014 | ||||||||||||
Publisher: | ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE | ||||||||||||
Place of Publication: | SAN DIEGO | ||||||||||||
ISSN: | 1095-7235 | ||||||||||||
Language: | English | ||||||||||||
Faculty: | Unspecified | ||||||||||||
Divisions: | Unspecified | ||||||||||||
Subjects: | no entry | ||||||||||||
Uncontrolled Keywords: |
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URI: | http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/44442 |
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