Universität zu Köln

Fang, Jieyan, Kempf, Alexander and Trapp, Monika (2014). Fund Manager Allocation. J. Financ. Econ., 111 (3). S. 661 - 675. LAUSANNE: ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA. ISSN 0304-405X

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Abstract

We show that fund families allocate their most skilled managers to market segments in which manager skill is rewarded best. In efficient markets, even skilled managers cannot generate excess returns. In less efficient markets, skilled managers can exploit inefficiencies and generate higher performance than unskilled managers. Fund families seem to be aware of the relation between skill, efficiency, and performance, and allocate more skilled managers to inefficient markets. They pursue this strategy when hiring new fund managers and when reassigning managers to funds within the family. Overall, we conclude that fund families allocate fund managers in an efficient way. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Fang, Jieyan UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Kempf, Alexander UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Trapp, Monika UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-445061
DOI:	10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.11.003
Journal or Publication Title:	J. Financ. Econ.
Volume:	111
Number:	3
Page Range:	S. 661 - 675
Date:	2014
Publisher:	ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA
Place of Publication:	LAUSANNE
ISSN:	0304-405X
Language:	English
Faculty:	Unspecified
Divisions:	Unspecified
Subjects:	no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language BOND MUTUAL FUNDS; PERFORMANCE; LIQUIDITY; RISK; MARKET; RETURNS; ABILITY; STOCKS; WAGE Multiple languages Business, Finance; Economics Multiple languages
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/44506