Universität zu Köln

Hennl, Annika (2014). Intra-party dynamics in mixed-member electoral systems: How strategies of candidate selection impact parliamentary behaviour. J. Theor. Polit., 26 (1). S. 93 - 117. LONDON: SAGE PUBLICATIONS LTD. ISSN 1460-3667

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Abstract

This paper contributes to our understanding of legislative behaviour in mixed-member electoral systems through a simple game-theoretic model. It argues that legislators seeking re-election in mixed-member electoral systems need to take into account the interests of two distinct selectorates rather than an electorate in order to maximize the probability of regaining a legislative mandate. Assuming that the policy interests of list and district selectorates systematically differ, legislators may face diverging demands from two principals whose relative capability to sanction incumbents crucially hinges upon the reward they may offer. Such reward, I argue, is best understood as the strength of the nomination, which refers to the probability of subsequent election. A simple game-theoretic model then shows how variation in the relative strength of both selectorates induces three different scenarios with distinct equilibrium outcomes and thus effectively impacts patterns of representation.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Hennl, Annika UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-451510
DOI:	10.1177/0951629813489547
Journal or Publication Title:	J. Theor. Polit.
Volume:	26
Number:	1
Page Range:	S. 93 - 117
Date:	2014
Publisher:	SAGE PUBLICATIONS LTD
Place of Publication:	LONDON
ISSN:	1460-3667
Language:	English
Faculty:	Unspecified
Divisions:	Unspecified
Subjects:	no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language POLITICAL-PARTIES; PERSONAL VOTE; INCENTIVES; RULES; REPRESENTATION; PLURALITY; GERMANY; MODELS Multiple languages Political Science Multiple languages
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/45151