Universität zu Köln

Sutter, Matthias ORCID: 0000-0002-6143-8706, Czermak, Simon and Feri, Francesco (2013). Strategic sophistication of individuals and teams. Experimental evidence. Eur. Econ. Rev., 64. S. 395 - 411. AMSTERDAM: ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV. ISSN 1873-572X

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Abstract

Many important decisions require strategic sophistication. We examine experimentally whether teams act more strategically than individuals. We let individuals and teams make choices in simple games, and also elicit first- and second-order beliefs. We find that teams play the Nash equilibrium strategy significantly more often, and their choices are more often a best response to stated first order beliefs. Distributional preferences make equilibrium play less likely. Using a mixture model, the estimated probability to play strategically is 62% for teams, but only 40% for individuals. A model of noisy introspection reveals that teams differ from individuals in higher order beliefs. (C) 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Sutter, Matthias UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0002-6143-8706 UNSPECIFIED Czermak, Simon UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Feri, Francesco UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-473414
DOI:	10.1016/j.euroecorev.2013.06.003
Journal or Publication Title:	Eur. Econ. Rev.
Volume:	64
Page Range:	S. 395 - 411
Date:	2013
Publisher:	ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
Place of Publication:	AMSTERDAM
ISSN:	1873-572X
Language:	English
Faculty:	Unspecified
Divisions:	Unspecified
Subjects:	no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language STATED BELIEFS; PLAY; BEHAVIOR; GAMES; EQUILIBRIUM; THINKING; MODELS Multiple languages Economics Multiple languages
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/47341