Universität zu Köln

Kittsteiner, Thomas, Ockenfels, Axel and Trhal, Nadja (2012). Partnership dissolution mechanisms in the laboratory. Econ. Lett., 117 (2). S. 394 - 397. LAUSANNE: ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA. ISSN 0165-1765

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Abstract

We experimentally compare two partnership dissolution mechanisms, the widely-used buy-sell clause and the winner's bid auction. While standard theory does well in organizing many laboratory patterns, it does not easily capture that many subjects bid valuations, especially in the buy-sell clause. As a result of this behavior, the buy-sell clause weakly outperforms the auction with respect to efficiency. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Kittsteiner, Thomas UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Ockenfels, Axel UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Trhal, Nadja UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-480288
DOI:	10.1016/j.econlet.2012.04.084
Journal or Publication Title:	Econ. Lett.
Volume:	117
Number:	2
Page Range:	S. 394 - 397
Date:	2012
Publisher:	ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA
Place of Publication:	LAUSANNE
ISSN:	0165-1765
Language:	English
Faculty:	Unspecified
Divisions:	Unspecified
Subjects:	no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language FAIR DIVISION Multiple languages Economics Multiple languages
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/48028