Hoppe, Eva I. and Schmitz, Patrick W. (2011). Can contracts solve the hold-up problem? Experimental evidence. Games Econ. Behav., 73 (1). S. 186 - 200. SAN DIEGO: ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE. ISSN 1090-2473
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
In the contract-theoretic literature, there is a vital debate about whether contracts can mitigate the hold-up problem, in particular when renegotiation cannot be prevented Ultimately, this question has to be answered empirically. As a first step, we have conducted a laboratory experiment with 960 participants. We consider investments that direction benefit the non-investing party. While according to standard theory, contracting would useless if renegotiation cannot be ruled out, we find that option contracts significant improve investment incentives compared to a no-contract treatment. This finding might be attributed to Hart and Moore's (2008) recent idea that contracts can serve as reference points. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Item Type: | Journal Article | ||||||||||||
Creators: |
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URN: | urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-489731 | ||||||||||||
DOI: | 10.1016/j.geb.2010.12.002 | ||||||||||||
Journal or Publication Title: | Games Econ. Behav. | ||||||||||||
Volume: | 73 | ||||||||||||
Number: | 1 | ||||||||||||
Page Range: | S. 186 - 200 | ||||||||||||
Date: | 2011 | ||||||||||||
Publisher: | ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE | ||||||||||||
Place of Publication: | SAN DIEGO | ||||||||||||
ISSN: | 1090-2473 | ||||||||||||
Language: | English | ||||||||||||
Faculty: | Unspecified | ||||||||||||
Divisions: | Unspecified | ||||||||||||
Subjects: | no entry | ||||||||||||
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URI: | http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/48973 |
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