Universität zu Köln

Vogel, Marius (2022). Essays in Public Economics. PhD thesis, Universität zu Köln.

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Abstract

Chapter 2, titled “Fair Inheritance Tax”, analyzes fair taxation in an intergenerational framework form a theoretical perspective. The combination of different fairness axioms, most notably Transfer (consumption inequality reducing transfers between otherwise ‘identical’ individuals is socially desirable) and Laissez-faire (if everyone has the same skill level and receives no bequest, taxation is not necessary) imply a concentration on the worst-off in society. Well-being is measured in a particular way: It is given by the wage rate someone would need in a world without taxation and received bequest to be indifferent to the status quo. In terms of taxation the fairness axioms imply a concentration on the highest average taxes payed by low-wage earners, who do not receive a bequest. This research extends Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2006) to an intergenerational context and complements Piketty and Saez (2013); Farhi and Werning (2010, 2013) from a fairness perspective. Chapter 3, titled “Regulating Multiple Externalities under Uncertainty”, revisits the question of optimal regulations from a theoretical point of view. In 2019 over 3000 economists signed a statement in favor of a uniform carbon tax. On the other hand, economists refer to Weitzman (1974) to defend a carbon tax or a market for CO2-certificates. The contribution of this chapter to the literature is threefold: First, to develop a flexible model to study the regulation of (multiple) externalities under uncertainty. Second, to provide a novel decomposition of Weitzman (1974)’s coefficient of comparative advantage into a quantity, a variance and a covariance effect. Third, to show that this decomposition can be analogously applied to the case of multiple externalities. In particular, under some circumstances, a sector specific regulation is superior to a universal regulation. Chapter 4, titled “Fair Compensations for Heterogeneous Labor Inputs”, is joint work with Raphael Flore and this study provides novel experimental evidence about normative preferences in situations with heterogeneous labor inputs. For this purpose we conduct an experiment in which impartial spectators choose the fair distribution of output in different scenarios. We argue that these preferences can be explained by an extended version of the ‘equity principle’. We find that spectators reward labor inputs more when they assess them as more tedious, toilsome, or time demanding. Spectators with high levels of education or income also value how intellectually demanding or pro- ductive a task is. Additionally, we show that the spectators’ choices are inconsistent with consequentialism.

Item Type:	Thesis (PhD thesis)
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Vogel, Marius marius.vogel@wiso.uni-koeln.de UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED
Contributors:	Contribution Name Email Author in quotations or text extracts Flore, Raphael r.flore@gmx.de
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-558990
Date:	16 February 2022
Language:	English
Faculty:	Faculty of Management, Economy and Social Sciences
Divisions:	Faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences > Economics > Macroeconomic, Financial and Economic Policy > Professorship for Public Economics
Subjects:	Economics
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language externalities, carbon tax, certificate markets, price and quantity regulation, sector specific regulation English Inheritance and Labor Taxation, Social Orderings, Fairness English Distribution, Fairness, Heterogeneous Inputs, Equity Principle, Consequentialism, Impartial Spectators English
Date of oral exam:	16 February 2022
Referee:	Name Academic Title Bierbrauer, Felix Prof. Dr. Münster, Johannes Prof. Dr.
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/55899