Universität zu Köln

Fochmann, Martin ORCID: 0000-0002-7747-1105, Mueller, Nadja and Overesch, Michael ORCID: 0000-0002-1531-0357 (2021). Less cheating? The effects of prefilled forms on compliance behavior. Journal of Economic Psychology, 83. p. 102365. AMSTERDAM: ELSEVIER. ISSN 1872-7719

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Abstract

As a consequence of digital transformation, individuals are often confronted with prefilled forms or prefilled data entry masks. In situations where cheating and lying are of concern, prefilling might reduce dishonest behavior. In a controlled experiment, we investigate how correctly and incorrectly prefilled forms influence compliance behavior. We frame our experiment as filing the annual income tax return. We show that correct prefilling enhances compliance. However, in cases of incorrect prefilling, we observe asymmetric effects. If prefilled income is lower than true income, we find no positive compliance effect, and compliance is on the same level as with blank forms. If prefilled income is higher than true income, prefilling still has a positive effect on compliance. In that case, compliance is on the same level as with correctly prefilled forms and higher than with blank forms. Our study contributes to the literature on cheating and lying by showing that prefilled forms affect compliance.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Fochmann, Martin UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0002-7747-1105 UNSPECIFIED Mueller, Nadja UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Overesch, Michael UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0002-1531-0357 UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-573821
DOI:	10.1016/j.joep.2021.102365
Journal or Publication Title:	Journal of Economic Psychology
Volume:	83
Page Range:	p. 102365
Date:	2021
Publisher:	ELSEVIER
Place of Publication:	AMSTERDAM
ISSN:	1872-7719
Language:	English
Faculty:	Unspecified
Divisions:	Unspecified
Subjects:	Psychology Management and auxiliary services
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language SLIPPERY SLOPE FRAMEWORK; VOLUNTARY TAX COMPLIANCE; EVASION; INCOME; MORALE; TRUST; AUTHORITIES; DECEPTION; KNOWLEDGE; DEFAULTS Multiple languages Economics; Psychology, Multidisciplinary Multiple languages
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/57382