Universität zu Köln

Fleischmann, Alexandra ORCID: 0000-0001-8290-4561, Lammers, Joris ORCID: 0000-0002-2647-121X, Diel, Kathi, Hofmann, Wilhelm and Galinsky, Adam D. (2021). More Threatening and More Diagnostic: How Moral Comparisons Differ From Social Comparisons. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol., 121 (5). S. 1057 - 1079. WASHINGTON: AMER PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOC. ISSN 1939-1315

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Abstract

The current research tests how comparisons in the moral domain differ from other social comparisons in three ways. First, an initial experience-sampling study shows that people compare downward more strongly in the moral domain than in most other domains (Study 1, N = 454), because people like to feel moral and present themselves as moral. Second, the classic threat principle of social comparison holds that people choose downward comparisons to improve their well-being after a threat to their self-esteem. We propose that in the moral domain the threat principle is intensified because morality is a uniquely important and central comparison domain. Across seven experiments (Experiments 2a and 2b, 3a-3c, 4a and 4b), we find that people search for downward comparisons much more than in other domains. This effect is so strong that people are willing to forgo money and incur time costs to avoid upward moral comparisons when threatened. Third, another classic principle of social comparison holds that people only consider comparisons that are diagnostic (i.e., close or similar) and therefore self-relevant, while dismissing extreme or dissimilar comparisons as irrelevant. We propose that this diagnosticity principle is attenuated because morality is a binding code that applies equally to all humans. Across four experiments (Experiments 5a and 5b, 6a and 6b), we find that even the most extreme and dissimilar moral (but not other) comparisons are deemed relevant and potentially threatening. Together, these twelve studies (total N = 5,543) demonstrate how moral comparisons are a ubiquitous but fundamentally distinct form of social comparison with altered basic principles.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Fleischmann, Alexandra UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0001-8290-4561 UNSPECIFIED Lammers, Joris UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0002-2647-121X UNSPECIFIED Diel, Kathi UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Hofmann, Wilhelm UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Galinsky, Adam D. UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-578720
DOI:	10.1037/pspi0000361
Journal or Publication Title:	J. Pers. Soc. Psychol.
Volume:	121
Number:	5
Page Range:	S. 1057 - 1079
Date:	2021
Publisher:	AMER PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOC
Place of Publication:	WASHINGTON
ISSN:	1939-1315
Language:	English
Faculty:	Faculty of Human Sciences Faculty of Management, Economy and Social Sciences
Divisions:	Faculty of Human Sciences > Department Psychologie Center of Excellence C-SEB
Subjects:	Psychology
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language SELF; JUDGMENT; CULTURE; QUALITY; OTHERS Multiple languages Psychology, Social Multiple languages
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/57872