Universität zu Köln

Hatfield, John William, Kominers, Scott Duke and Westkamp, Alexander ORCID: 0000-0001-6892-1189 (2021). Stability, Strategy-Proofness, and Cumulative Offer Mechanisms. Rev. Econ. Stud., 88 (3). S. 1457 - 1503. OXFORD: OXFORD UNIV PRESS. ISSN 1467-937X

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Abstract

We characterize when a stable and strategy-proof mechanism is guaranteed to exist in the setting of many-to-one matching with contracts. We introduce three novel conditions-observable substitutability, observable size monotonicity, and non-manipulability via contractual terms-and show that when these conditions are satisfied, the cumulative offer mechanism is the unique mechanism that is stable and strategy-proof (for workers). Moreover, we show that our three conditions are, in a sense, necessary: if the choice function of some firm fails any of our three conditions, we can construct unit-demand choice functions for the other firms such that no stable and strategy-proof mechanism exists. Thus, our results provide a rationale for the ubiquity of cumulative offer mechanisms in practice.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Hatfield, John William UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Kominers, Scott Duke UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Westkamp, Alexander UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0001-6892-1189 UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-582963
DOI:	10.1093/restud/rdaa052
Journal or Publication Title:	Rev. Econ. Stud.
Volume:	88
Number:	3
Page Range:	S. 1457 - 1503
Date:	2021
Publisher:	OXFORD UNIV PRESS
Place of Publication:	OXFORD
ISSN:	1467-937X
Language:	English
Faculty:	Faculty of Management, Economy and Social Sciences
Divisions:	Center of Excellence C-SEB
Subjects:	Economics
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language COLLEGE ADMISSIONS; STABLE MATCHINGS; CONSTRAINTS; CONTRACTS; SUBSTITUTES; MARKETS Multiple languages Economics Multiple languages
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/58296