Universität zu Köln

Bierbrauer, Felix ORCID: 0000-0003-3879-9607, Boyer, Pierre C. ORCID: 0000-0002-5495-7380 and Peichl, Andreas ORCID: 0000-0002-0680-8321 (2021). Politically Feasible Reforms of Nonlinear Tax Systems. Am. Econ. Rev., 111 (1). S. 153 - 192. NASHVILLE: AMER ECONOMIC ASSOC. ISSN 1944-7981

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Abstract

We study reforms of nonlinear income tax systems from a political economy perspective. We present a median voter theorem for monotonic tax reforms, reforms so that the change in the tax burden is a monotonic function of income. We also provide an empirical analysis of tax reforms, with a focus on the United States. We show that past reforms have, by and large, been monotonic. We also show that support by the median voter was aligned with majority support in the population. Finally, we develop sufficient statistics that enable to test whether a given tax system admits a politically feasible reform.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Bierbrauer, Felix UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0003-3879-9607 UNSPECIFIED Boyer, Pierre C. UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0002-5495-7380 UNSPECIFIED Peichl, Andreas UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0002-0680-8321 UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-584024
DOI:	10.1257/aer20190021
Journal or Publication Title:	Am. Econ. Rev.
Volume:	111
Number:	1
Page Range:	S. 153 - 192
Date:	2021
Publisher:	AMER ECONOMIC ASSOC
Place of Publication:	NASHVILLE
ISSN:	1944-7981
Language:	English
Faculty:	Faculty of Management, Economy and Social Sciences
Divisions:	Center of Excellence C-SEB Faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences > Economics > Macroeconomic, Financial and Economic Policy > Professorship for Macroeconomic
Subjects:	Economics
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language CAPITAL TAXATION; SOCIAL-MOBILITY; TAXABLE INCOME; UNITED-STATES; WELFARE; PREFERENCES; RATES; COMPETITION; MODEL Multiple languages Economics Multiple languages
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/58402