Universität zu Köln

Hassanali, Farzaneh (2022). Where is the Place for Rationality in Scientific Methodologies? An Inquiry into the Methodologies of Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn, and Imre Lakatos. PhD thesis, Universität zu Köln.

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Abstract

This dissertation explores the role of rationality in scientific methodologies, particularly within the context of the philosophy of science. It addresses whether certain methodological approaches are not only internally coherent, but also practically adequate and epistemically fruitful. The work presents a comparative analysis of the competing methodologies of Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn, and Imre Lakatos, evaluated through the lens of scientific realism. The investigation begins with a historical overview of the development of the philosophy of science, focusing on its epistemic character. At the core of this work is the question of the rationality of scientific methodologies: Are they internally consistent? Are they suitable for scientific practice? Do they advance the epistemic goals of science, such as truth approximation? Rationality in this context is defined as the link between theoretical knowledge and practical applicability, particularly the ability to produce successful predictions. A rational methodology, it is argued, must also include value judgments about scientific theories and their societal roles. Within this framework, the dissertation examines three methodological approaches. 1. Popper’s Algorithmic Methodology: Popper asserts that science can be demarcated from pseudo-science through falsifiability. His concept of rationality emphasizes empirical testing and refutation rather than confirmation. The more testable a theory, the better. However, this dissertation demonstrates that Popper's methodology faces internal inconsistencies and pragmatic shortcomings. Theory choice in his system ultimately depends on conventional decisions, and the approach is often misaligned with actual scientific practice. 2. Kuhn’s Paradigm-Based Model: Kuhn focuses on the socio-psychological dimension of science. Scientific progress occurs within paradigms through “normal science,” which is occasionally disrupted by revolutions that shift paradigms. Kuhn’s model denies the possibility of objective theory comparison due to incommensurability. Nevertheless, he highlights internal rationality within paradigms—their ability to solve problems from within. This dissertation argues that Kuhn’s approach is more practice-oriented than Popper’s but lacks a continuous structure of rationality. 3. Lakatos’ Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes: Lakatos synthesizes Popper’s normative criteria with Kuhn’s historiographical sensitivity. His model describes science as a competition between rival research programmes, each defined by a "hard core" of assumptions and heuristic rules. A programme is rational if it progresses by producing novel, empirically confirmed predictions. Lakatos introduces a spiral model of theory development, emphasizing cumulative, dynamic progression. Unlike Popper’s linear model or Kuhn’s revolutionary shifts, Lakatos’ methodology enables continuous rationality, accommodating theoretical diversity and long-term improvement. The dissertation defends this as the most comprehensive and adequate model of scientific rationality. The dissertation concludes that Lakatos’ methodology best captures the complexity of scientific practice, combining historical continuity, normativity, and practical applicability. His spiral model preserves the rational core of methodology while remaining open to historical change and theoretical competition. This model accommodates both epistemic progress and methodological self-correction, offering a scientifically realistic, flexible, and rationally coherent framework for understanding the development of science.

Item Type:	Thesis (PhD thesis)
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Hassanali, Farzaneh far.hassanali@gmail.com UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-785893
Date:	2022
Language:	English
Faculty:	Faculty of Arts and Humanities
Divisions:	Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Fächergruppe 8: Philosophie > Philosophisches Seminar
Subjects:	Philosophy
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language Philosophy of Science, Scientific Rationality, Scientific Realism, Methodology of Science, Theory Change, Critical Rationalism, Falsifiability, Incommensurability, Research Programmes, Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn, Imre Lakatos, Epistemic Progress, Theory-ladenness, Rational Theory Choice, Explanation and Prediction, Normativity in Science, Paradigm Shifts, History of Science English
Date of oral exam:	27 October 2022
Referee:	Name Academic Title Hüttemann, Andreas Prof. Dr. Hoffmann-Kolss, Vera Prof. Dr. Helmig, Christopher Prof. Dr.
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/78589