Universität zu Köln

Kohlleppel, Laura (2018). Essays in Public Economics. PhD thesis, Universität zu Köln.

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Abstract

The given thesis includes three independent chapters which all contribute to the theory of public economics. They are linked, theoretically, by the fact that an information asymmetry is included in the presented environment. In the first two chapters agents are assumed to hold private information on their preferences. Making use of a mechanism design approach, applications such as a bilateral trade problem, the provision of a public good and the design of an optimal income tax schedule are studied. More precisely, Chapter 1 relates discrete and continuous formulations of the independent private values model and derives conditions under which these two behave qualitatively the same. Chapter 2 studies how a Mirrleesian income tax model is affected by the assumption of arbitrary directions of redistribution and addresses the question how the corresponding optimal income tax schedules should be designed. In the third chapter individuals are incompletely informed about the characteristics of a public good. Only incomplete information on the good's productivity and governmental contributions are available such that salience becomes a driving factor for individual behavior and hence, the provision of the good. A common aim of all three chapters is to disentangle and evaluate the effects of information asymmetry in the respective setting. In an environment as considered in the first two chapters, individuals being privately informed about preferences yields a social cost. Thus, only a second-best situation can be reached where welfare is lower compared to a full information environment. However, this is not true in a situation as studied in Chapter 3. Here, the information asymmetry can be exploited by a benevolent government to improve welfare compared to a situation with complete information. Conclusively, the effects of information asymmetry on welfare and optimal allocations are non-trivial and depend on the considered environment.

Item Type:	Thesis (PhD thesis)
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Kohlleppel, Laura laura.kohlleppel@gmx.de UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-85865
Date:	July 2018
Language:	English
Faculty:	Faculty of Management, Economy and Social Sciences
Divisions:	Weitere Institute, Arbeits- und Forschungsgruppen > Center for Macroeconomic Research (CMR)
Subjects:	Economics
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language Mechanism Design UNSPECIFIED Income Taxation UNSPECIFIED Public goods UNSPECIFIED Salience UNSPECIFIED welfare weights UNSPECIFIED bilateral trade UNSPECIFIED
Date of oral exam:	7 September 2018
Referee:	Name Academic Title Bierbrauer, Felix Prof. Dr. Barbie, Martin Prof. Dr.
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/8586