Mass, Helene (2019). Robust Behavior in Auctions. PhD thesis, Universität zu Köln.


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This thesis consists of three chapters which analyze mechanisms and strategies in auctions which are robust with respect to uncertainty about the given economic setting. In the first chapter the agent facing uncertainty has to delegate the execution of a procurement auction to an auctioneer whose particular choice of the auction mechanism is not known to the agent. While the auctioneer may have a favorite bidder, the goal of the agent is to ensure the absence of discrimination. Thus, the rule “imitation perfection” is introduced which ensures that every auction fulfilling this rule is discrimination-free. In the second chapter bidders participating in a first-price auction face uncertainty about each other’s valuation distributions because only the support and the mean of the valuation distributions are common knowledge. In order to derive a strategy under this uncertainty, bidders form a subjective belief which is a worst-case belief. The third chapter analyzes of an abstract game of incomplete information where an agent faces uncertainty about the other players’ strategies. A new decision criterion is proposed which allows the agent to derive strategies given strategic uncertainty. The third chapter also contains the application of this decision criterion to first-price auctions.

Item Type: Thesis (PhD thesis)
CreatorsEmailORCIDORCID Put Code
Mass, Heleneecon.helene.mass@gmail.comUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
URN: urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-92556
Date: 2019
Language: English
Faculty: Faculty of Management, Economy and Social Sciences
Divisions: Faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences
Subjects: Economics
Uncontrolled Keywords:
Auctions, uncertainty, informational robustness, worst-case beliefs, discriminationEnglish
Date of oral exam: 5 November 2018
NameAcademic Title
Wambach, AchimProf. Ph.D.
Bierbrauer, FelixProf. Dr.
Refereed: Yes


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