Universität zu Köln

Journal Article

Leib, Margarita ORCID: 0000-0003-1447-3186, Köbis, Nils ORCID: 0000-0002-0608-7333, Rilke, Rainer Michael ORCID: 0000-0001-8901-860X, Hagens, Marloes ORCID: 0000-0003-4584-8892 and Irlenbusch, Bernd ORCID: 0000-0002-3433-2826 (2023). Corrupted by Algorithms? How AI-generated and Human-written Advice Shape (Dis)honesty. The Economic Journal, 134 (658). pp. 766-784. Oxford University Press. ISSN 0013-0133

Leib, Margarita, Köbis, Nils, Rilke, Rainer Michael ORCID: 0000-0001-8901-860X, Hagens, Marloes and Irlenbusch, Bernd ORCID: 0000-0002-3433-2826 (2023). Corrupted by Algorithms? How AI-generated and Human-written Advice Shape (Dis)honesty. De.arxiv.org. Arxiv.org.

Leib, Margarita, Köbis, Nils ORCID: 0000-0002-0608-7333, Rilke, Rainer Michael ORCID: 0000-0001-8901-860X, Hagens, Marloes and Irlenbusch, Bernd ORCID: 0000-0002-3433-2826 (2021). The corruptive force of AI-generated advice. De.arxiv.org. Arxiv.org.

Rilke, Rainer Michael ORCID: 0000-0001-8901-860X, Danilov, Anastasia ORCID: 0000-0003-3662-4897, Weisel, Ori, Shalvi, Shaul ORCID: 0000-0003-2225-7352 and Irlenbusch, Bernd ORCID: 0000-0002-3433-2826 (2021). When leading by example leads to less corrupt collaboration. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 188. pp. 288-306. Elsevier. ISSN 0167-2681

Irlenbusch, Bernd ORCID: 0000-0002-3433-2826, Rilke, Rainer Michael ORCID: 0000-0001-8901-860X and Walkowitz, Gari (2019). Designing feedback in voluntary contribution games: the role of transparency. Experimental Economics, 22 (2). pp. 552-576. Springer Science. ISSN 1573-6938

Hennig-Schmidt, Heike, Irlenbusch, Bernd ORCID: 0000-0002-3433-2826, Rilke, Rainer Michael ORCID: 0000-0001-8901-860X and Walkowitz, Gari (2019). Self-Serving Use of Equity Rules in Bargaining with Asymmetric Outside Options. Experimental Economics, 22 (2). pp. 552-576. Springer Science. ISSN 1573-6938

Hennig-Schmidt, Heike, Irlenbusch, Bernd ORCID: 0000-0002-3433-2826, Rilke, Rainer Michael ORCID: 0000-0001-8901-860X and Walkowitz, Gari (2018). Asymmetric outside options in ultimatum bargaining: a systematic analysis. International Journal of Game Theory, 47 (1). pp. 301-329. Springer Nature. ISSN 0020-7276

Rilke, Rainer Michael ORCID: 0000-0001-8901-860X, Danilov, Anastasia ORCID: 0000-0003-3662-4897, Irlenbusch, Bernd ORCID: 0000-0002-3433-2826, Weisel, Ori and Shalvi, Shaul ORCID: 0000-0003-2225-7352 (2018). The Honest Leader Effect - How Hierarchies Affect Honesty in Groups. Academy of Management Proceedings, 2018 (1). p. 10365. Academy of Management. ISSN 0065-0668

Conrads, Julian, Irlenbusch, Bernd ORCID: 0000-0002-3433-2826, Reggiani, Tommaso ORCID: 0000-0002-3134-1049, Rilke, Rainer Michael ORCID: 0000-0001-8901-860X and Sliwka, Dirk ORCID: 0000-0002-8026-0165 (2016). How to hire helpers? Evidence from a field experiment. Experimental Economic, 19 (3). pp. 577-594. Springer Science. ISSN 1386-4157

Conrads, Julian, Reggiani, Tommaso ORCID: 0000-0002-3134-1049 and Rilke, Rainer Michael ORCID: 0000-0001-8901-860X (2016). Reducing ambiguity in lotteries: evidence from a field experiment. Appl. Econ. Lett., 23 (3). S. 206 - 212. ABINGDON: ROUTLEDGE JOURNALS, TAYLOR & FRANCIS LTD. ISSN 1466-4291

Lonnqvist, Jan-Erik ORCID: 0000-0001-8292-6090, Rilke, Rainer Michael ORCID: 0000-0001-8901-860X and Walkowitz, Gari (2015). On why hypocrisy thrives: Reasonable doubt created by moral posturing can deter punishment. J. Exp. Soc. Psychol., 59. S. 139 - 146. SAN DIEGO: ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE. ISSN 1096-0465

Conrads, Julian, Irlenbusch, Bernd ORCID: 0000-0002-3433-2826, Rilke, Rainer Michael ORCID: 0000-0001-8901-860X, Schielke, Anne ORCID: 0000-0002-1952-4758 and Walkowitz, Gari (2014). Honesty in tournaments. Econ. Lett., 123 (1). S. 90 - 94. LAUSANNE: ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA. ISSN 1873-7374

Preprints, Working Papers or Reports

Conrads, Julian, Ellenberger, Mischa, Irlenbusch, Bernd ORCID: 0000-0002-3433-2826, Ohms, Elia Nora, Rilke, Rainer Michael ORCID: 0000-0001-8901-860X and Walkowitz, Gari (2017). Team Goal Incentives and Individual Lying Behavior. Working Paper.