Universität zu Köln

The failure of the revenue equivalence principle: multiple objects, information acquisition and favoritism

Gretschko, Vitali (2012) The failure of the revenue equivalence principle: multiple objects, information acquisition and favoritism. PhD thesis, Universität zu Köln.

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    Abstract

    A celebrated result of auction theory is the revenue equivalence principle which states that with independent private values and a single unit for sale all selling (or procurement) mechanisms that give the object to the bidder with the highest valuation generate the same revenue. The present thesis explores in each chapter a different deviation from the revenue equivalence princi- ple and compares selling (or procurement) mechanisms that would be equivalent otherwise. In chapter two the equivalence between the first-price auction and the descending auction fails if more than one unit is for sale. In chapter three and four the equivalence between all four of the standard auction formats fails in the case that bidders are not fully informed about their private valuation and may acquire additional information in the course of the auction. The fifth chapter theoretically analyzes the differences between optimal auctions and negotiations that can only arise in the presence of favoritism.

    Item Type: Thesis (PhD thesis)
    Creators:
    CreatorsEmail
    Gretschko, Vitalivgretschko@gmail.com
    URN: urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-49080
    Subjects: Economics
    Uncontrolled Keywords:
    KeywordsLanguage
    Dynamic mechanisms, auctions, information acquisition, revenue equivalence, corruptionEnglish
    Faculty: Wirtschafts- u. Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät
    Divisions: Wirtschafts- u. Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät > Staatswissenschaftliches (Volkswirtschaftliches) Seminar
    Language: English
    Date: 14 December 2012
    Date Type: Publication
    Date of oral exam: 08 November 2012
    Full Text Status: Public
    Date Deposited: 29 Nov 2012 16:43:05
    Referee
    NameAcademic Title
    Schmitz, PatrickProf. Dr.
    Ockenfels, AxelProf. Dr.
    URI: http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/4908

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