Universität zu Köln

Gretschko, Vitali (2012). The failure of the revenue equivalence principle: multiple objects, information acquisition and favoritism. PhD thesis, Universität zu Köln.

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Abstract

A celebrated result of auction theory is the revenue equivalence principle which states that with independent private values and a single unit for sale all selling (or procurement) mechanisms that give the object to the bidder with the highest valuation generate the same revenue. The present thesis explores in each chapter a different deviation from the revenue equivalence princi- ple and compares selling (or procurement) mechanisms that would be equivalent otherwise. In chapter two the equivalence between the first-price auction and the descending auction fails if more than one unit is for sale. In chapter three and four the equivalence between all four of the standard auction formats fails in the case that bidders are not fully informed about their private valuation and may acquire additional information in the course of the auction. The fifth chapter theoretically analyzes the differences between optimal auctions and negotiations that can only arise in the presence of favoritism.

Item Type:	Thesis (PhD thesis)
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Gretschko, Vitali vgretschko@gmail.com UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-49080
Date:	14 December 2012
Language:	English
Faculty:	Faculty of Management, Economy and Social Sciences
Divisions:	Weitere Institute, Arbeits- und Forschungsgruppen > Staatswissenschaftliches Seminar
Subjects:	Economics
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language Dynamic mechanisms, auctions, information acquisition, revenue equivalence, corruption English
Date of oral exam:	8 November 2012
Referee:	Name Academic Title Schmitz, Patrick Prof. Dr. Ockenfels, Axel Prof. Dr.
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/4908