Apffelstaedt, Arno ORCID: 0000-0002-6019-7162 (2025). Spontaneous discrimination with endogenous information disclosure. Journal of Economic Theory, 229. pp. 1-20. Elsevier. ISSN 0022-0531

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Identification Number:10.1016/j.jet.2025.106076

Abstract

[Artikel-Nr.: 106076] I introduce endogenous information disclosure into a model of “spontaneous discrimination” à la Peski and Szentes (2013). Individuals in a finite population repeatedly decide whether to engage in profitable interactions with a randomly assigned or chosen partner. Each individual has a fixed physical and a dynamic social color. Social color conveys information about the colors of past partners—but only if that information is disclosed by the decision maker or a random observer. I characterize conditions under which endogenous disclosure supports inefficient equilibria where individuals discriminate by conditioning interactions on the (payoff-irrelevant) colors of potential partners. The analysis shows how competition for being selected as partner interacts with discriminatory norms to create strict incentives for information disclosure, thereby sustaining discrimination that would otherwise break down

Item Type: Article
Creators:
Creators
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ORCID
ORCID Put Code
Apffelstaedt, Arno
UNSPECIFIED
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URN: urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-809777
Identification Number: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106076
Journal or Publication Title: Journal of Economic Theory
Volume: 229
Page Range: pp. 1-20
Number of Pages: 20
Date: October 2025
Publisher: Elsevier
ISSN: 0022-0531
Language: English
Faculty: Faculty of Management, Economy and Social Sciences
Divisions: Faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences > Business Administration > Corporate Development > Assistant Professorship for Corporate Development
Subjects: Social sciences
Uncontrolled Keywords:
Keywords
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Spontaneous discrimination ; Repeated games ; Social norms ; Endogenous information disclosure
English
['eprint_fieldname_oa_funders' not defined]: Publikationsfonds UzK
Refereed: Yes
URI: http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/80977

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