Universität zu Köln

Manthei, Kathrin ORCID: 0000-0002-9170-0322 and Sliwka, Dirk ORCID: 0000-0002-8026-0165 (2019). Multitasking and Subjective Performance Evaluations: Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment in a Bank. Manage. Sci., 65 (12). S. 5861 - 5884. CATONSVILLE: INFORMS. ISSN 1526-5501

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Abstract

We study the incentive effects of granting supervisors access to objective performance information when agents work on multiple tasks. We first analyze a formal model showing that incentives are lower powered when supervisors have no access to objective measures but assess performance subjectively by gathering information. This incentive loss is more pronounced when the span of control is larger and incentives are distorted toward more profitable tasks. We then investigate a field experiment conducted in a bank. In the treatment group, managers obtained access to objective performance measures, which raised efforts and profits. We find that the effects are driven by larger branches and lower margin products.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Manthei, Kathrin UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0002-9170-0322 UNSPECIFIED Sliwka, Dirk UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0002-8026-0165 UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-126045
DOI:	10.1287/mnsc.2018.3206
Journal or Publication Title:	Manage. Sci.
Volume:	65
Number:	12
Page Range:	S. 5861 - 5884
Date:	2019
Publisher:	INFORMS
Place of Publication:	CATONSVILLE
ISSN:	1526-5501
Language:	English
Faculty:	Faculty of Management, Economy and Social Sciences
Divisions:	Center of Excellence C-SEB Faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences > Business Administration > Corporate Development > Professorship for Business Administration and Human Resources Management
Subjects:	Economics
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language INCENTIVE CONTRACTS Multiple languages Management; Operations Research & Management Science Multiple languages
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/12604