Universität zu Köln

Alempaki, Despoina, Dogan, Goenuel and Saccardo, Silvia (2019). Deception and reciprocity. Exp. Econ., 22 (4). S. 980 - 1002. DORDRECHT: SPRINGER. ISSN 1573-6938

Full text not available from this repository.

Abstract

We experimentally investigate the relationship between (un)kind actions and subsequent deception in a two-player, two-stage game. The first stage involves a dictator game. In the second-stage, the recipient in the dictator game has the opportunity to lie to her counterpart. We study how the fairness of dictator-game outcomes affects subsequent lying decisions where lying hurts one's counterpart. In doing so, we examine whether the moral cost of lying varies when retaliating against unkind actions is financially beneficial for the self (selfish lies), as opposed to being costly (spiteful lies). We find evidence that individuals engage in deception to reciprocate unkind behavior: The smaller the payoff received in the first stage, the higher the lying rate. Intention-based reciprocity largely drives behavior, as individuals use deception to punish unkind behavior and truth-telling to reward kind behavior. For selfish lies, individuals have a moral cost of lying. However, for spiteful lies, we find no evidence for such costs. Taken together, our data show a moral cost of lying that is not fixed but instead context-dependent.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Alempaki, Despoina UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Dogan, Goenuel UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Saccardo, Silvia UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-126573
DOI:	10.1007/s10683-018-09599-3
Journal or Publication Title:	Exp. Econ.
Volume:	22
Number:	4
Page Range:	S. 980 - 1002
Date:	2019
Publisher:	SPRINGER
Place of Publication:	DORDRECHT
ISSN:	1573-6938
Language:	English
Faculty:	Unspecified
Divisions:	Unspecified
Subjects:	no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language MORAL DISENGAGEMENT; FAIRNESS; ALTRUISM; LIES; PREFERENCES; INCENTIVES; DISHONESTY; AVERSION; EXERCISE; PROMISES Multiple languages Economics Multiple languages
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/12657