Khalmetski, Kiryl and Sliwka, Dirk ORCID: 0000-0002-8026-0165 (2019). Disguising Lies-Image Concerns and Partial Lying in Cheating Games. Am. Econ. J.-Microecon., 11 (4). S. 79 - 112. NASHVILLE: AMER ECONOMIC ASSOC. ISSN 1945-7685
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
We study equilibrium reporting behavior in cheating games when agents have a fixed cost of lying and image concerns not to be perceived as a liar. We show that equilibria naturally arise in which agents with low costs of lying randomize among a set of the highest potential reports. Such equilibria induce a distribution of reports in line with observed experimental patterns. We also find that higher image concerns lead to an increase in the range of reported lies, while the effect of the fixed cost of lying is the opposite.
Item Type: | Journal Article | ||||||||||||
Creators: |
|
||||||||||||
URN: | urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-128315 | ||||||||||||
DOI: | 10.1257/mic.20170193 | ||||||||||||
Journal or Publication Title: | Am. Econ. J.-Microecon. | ||||||||||||
Volume: | 11 | ||||||||||||
Number: | 4 | ||||||||||||
Page Range: | S. 79 - 112 | ||||||||||||
Date: | 2019 | ||||||||||||
Publisher: | AMER ECONOMIC ASSOC | ||||||||||||
Place of Publication: | NASHVILLE | ||||||||||||
ISSN: | 1945-7685 | ||||||||||||
Language: | English | ||||||||||||
Faculty: | Faculty of Management, Economy and Social Sciences | ||||||||||||
Divisions: | Center of Excellence C-SEB Faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences > Business Administration > Corporate Development > Professorship for Business Administration and Human Resources Management |
||||||||||||
Subjects: | Economics | ||||||||||||
Uncontrolled Keywords: |
|
||||||||||||
Refereed: | Yes | ||||||||||||
URI: | http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/12831 |
Downloads
Downloads per month over past year
Altmetric
Export
Actions (login required)
View Item |