Universität zu Köln

Grundmann, Thomas (2019). How to respond rationally to peer disagreement: The preemption view. Philos. Issues, 29 (1). S. 129 - 143. HOBOKEN: WILEY. ISSN 1758-2237

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Abstract

In this paper, I argue that the two most common views of how to respond rationally to peer disagreement-the Total Evidence View (TEV) and the Equal Weight View (EWV)-are both inadequate for substantial reasons. TEV does not issue the correct intuitive verdicts about a number of hypothetical cases of peer disagreement. The same is true for EWV. In addition, EWV does not give any explanation of what is rationally required of agents on the basis of sufficiently general epistemic principles. I will then argue that there is a genuine alternative to both views-the Preemption View (PV)-that fares substantially better in both respects. I will give an outline and a detailed defense of PV in the paper.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Grundmann, Thomas UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-132305
DOI:	10.1111/phis.12144
Journal or Publication Title:	Philos. Issues
Volume:	29
Number:	1
Page Range:	S. 129 - 143
Date:	2019
Publisher:	WILEY
Place of Publication:	HOBOKEN
ISSN:	1758-2237
Language:	English
Faculty:	Faculty of Arts and Humanities
Divisions:	Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Fächergruppe 8: Philosophie > Philosophisches Seminar
Subjects:	no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language HIGHER-ORDER EVIDENCE; EPISTEMOLOGY Multiple languages Philosophy Multiple languages
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/13230