Universität zu Köln

Fehr, Dietmar and Sutter, Matthias (2019). Gossip and the efficiency of interactions. Games Econ. Behav., 113. S. 448 - 461. SAN DIEGO: ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE. ISSN 1090-2473

Full text not available from this repository.

Abstract

Human communication often involves a large amount of gossiping about others. Here we study in an experiment whether gossip affects the efficiency of human interactions in an experimental trust game. Third parties can send unverifiable messages about a trustee's behavior to a trustor. We find that this form of gossip increases trust and trustworthiness compared to a situation without a third party. However, a large part of this increase is due to the mere observation of trustees through third parties. In further control treatments we check the robustness of our findings by examining the effects of the information structure, costs or informational value of gossip. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Fehr, Dietmar UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Sutter, Matthias UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-139285
DOI:	10.1016/j.geb.2018.10.003
Journal or Publication Title:	Games Econ. Behav.
Volume:	113
Page Range:	S. 448 - 461
Date:	2019
Publisher:	ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE
Place of Publication:	SAN DIEGO
ISSN:	1090-2473
Language:	English
Faculty:	Unspecified
Divisions:	Unspecified
Subjects:	no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language 3RD-PARTY PUNISHMENT; REPUTATION; TRUST; COMMUNICATION; TRUSTWORTHINESS; RECIPROCITY; GAMES; COOPERATION; INCENTIVES; PROMISES Multiple languages Economics Multiple languages
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/13928