Cramton, Peter ORCID: 0000-0001-8621-1092 and Ockenfels, Axel ORCID: 0000-0003-1456-0191 (2017). The German 4G Spectrum Auction: Design and Behavior. Econ. J., 127 (605). S. F305 - 20. HOBOKEN: WILEY. ISSN 1468-0297
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
The 2010 German 4G spectrum auction was an unusually large simultaneous ascending multi-band auction. The bidding was competitive and the final assignment was efficient. However, our analysis suggests that independent and rational bidders had an opportunity to coordinate implicitly on a low-revenue outcome. Coordination was difficult, though, because of a multiplicity of focal points. One important focal point involved post-auction negotiations, posing risks to bidders and the auctioneer. We analyse different bidding scenarios and how post-auction negotiations can affect values, bidding and efficiency. We also discuss how the simultaneous ascending auction format can be augmented to mitigate the risks.
Item Type: | Journal Article | ||||||||||||
Creators: |
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URN: | urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-214686 | ||||||||||||
DOI: | 10.1111/ecoj.12406 | ||||||||||||
Journal or Publication Title: | Econ. J. | ||||||||||||
Volume: | 127 | ||||||||||||
Number: | 605 | ||||||||||||
Page Range: | S. F305 - 20 | ||||||||||||
Date: | 2017 | ||||||||||||
Publisher: | WILEY | ||||||||||||
Place of Publication: | HOBOKEN | ||||||||||||
ISSN: | 1468-0297 | ||||||||||||
Language: | English | ||||||||||||
Faculty: | Faculty of Management, Economy and Social Sciences | ||||||||||||
Divisions: | Faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences > Economics > Macroeconomic, Financial and Economic Policy > Professur für Economics, Design and Behavior Center of Excellence C-SEB |
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Subjects: | Economics | ||||||||||||
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Refereed: | Yes | ||||||||||||
URI: | http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/21468 |
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