Universität zu Köln

Walkowitz, Gari and Weiss, Arne R. (2017). Read my lips! (but only if I was elected)! Experimental evidence on the effects of electoral competition on promises, shirking and trust. J. Econ. Behav. Organ., 142. S. 348 - 368. AMSTERDAM: ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV. ISSN 1879-1751

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Abstract

We experimentally test whether electoral competition reduces shirking behavior by office-holders and increases citizens' trust. Using a novel multi-person investment game with voting, we indeed find that elected office-holders shirk less (i.e., they back-transfer more to citizens relative to investments) than randomly appointed office-holders. Surprisingly, this effect is not driven by electoral competition inflating office-holders' promises. Instead, elected office-holders feel more committed to their promises than their randomly appointed counterparts. Elections initially also increase citizens' trust because voters select candidates With the right kind of promises: neither low nor non-credibly high. However, over the course of the entire experiment, we find no evidence that electoral competition increases citizens' trust. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Walkowitz, Gari UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Weiss, Arne R. UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-215623
DOI:	10.1016/j.jebo.2017.06.012
Journal or Publication Title:	J. Econ. Behav. Organ.
Volume:	142
Page Range:	S. 348 - 368
Date:	2017
Publisher:	ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
Place of Publication:	AMSTERDAM
ISSN:	1879-1751
Language:	English
Faculty:	Unspecified
Divisions:	Unspecified
Subjects:	no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language CAMPAIGN PROMISES; POLITICAL TRUST; SOCIAL DILEMMAS; COOPERATION; ELECTIONS; COMMUNICATION; INSTITUTIONS; METAANALYSIS; RECIPROCITY; LEADERSHIP Multiple languages Economics Multiple languages
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/21562