Alos-Ferrer, Carlos ORCID: 0000-0002-1668-9784 and Buckenmaier, Johannes ORCID: 0000-0002-2070-6647 (2017). Cournot vs. Walras: A reappraisal through simulations. J. Econ. Dyn. Control, 82. S. 257 - 273. AMSTERDAM: ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV. ISSN 1879-1743

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Abstract

Best-reply behavior in Cournot oligopolies generally leads to Cournot-Nash equilibrium, but imitative behavior selects the Walrasian equilibrium as the unique stochastically stable state. Previous work (Alos-Ferrer, 2004) showed that in the presence of memory, imitative behavior leads to a non-trivial dynamics selecting all quantities between the Cournot and Walrasian outcomes. However, the scope of previous results was limited to specific assumptions on demand and cost functions, and did not provide information on the shape of the distribution of outcomes. We use computational simulations to address these limitations. We show that the selection result for non-trivial memory holds beyond the set of well-behaved Cournot games previously analyzed. Further, we find that, in Cournot games, the limit distribution of long-run outcomes is highly skewed towards the Walrasian quantity. Although longer memory increases the importance of the Cournot equilibrium, the competitive outcome remains the dominant prediction. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Item Type: Journal Article
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCIDORCID Put Code
Alos-Ferrer, CarlosUNSPECIFIEDorcid.org/0000-0002-1668-9784UNSPECIFIED
Buckenmaier, JohannesUNSPECIFIEDorcid.org/0000-0002-2070-6647UNSPECIFIED
URN: urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-220859
DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2017.07.001
Journal or Publication Title: J. Econ. Dyn. Control
Volume: 82
Page Range: S. 257 - 273
Date: 2017
Publisher: ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
Place of Publication: AMSTERDAM
ISSN: 1879-1743
Language: English
Faculty: Unspecified
Divisions: Unspecified
Subjects: no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:
KeywordsLanguage
OLIGOPOLY; EVOLUTION; GAMES; BEHAVIOR; MODELMultiple languages
EconomicsMultiple languages
Refereed: Yes
URI: http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/22085

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