Universität zu Köln

Kusterer, David J. ORCID: 0000-0001-8891-4488 and Schmitz, Patrick W. ORCID: 0000-0003-3461-5102 (2017). The management of innovation: Experimental evidence. Games Econ. Behav., 104. S. 706 - 726. SAN DIEGO: ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE. ISSN 1090-2473

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Abstract

We report data from a laboratory experiment with 576 participants that was designed to test Aghion and Tirole's (1994a) management of innovation theory which is based on the Grossman-Hart-Moore property rights approach. A research unit and a customer can invest to increase the probability of making an innovation. When the innovation is made, the parties bargain over the division of the revenue. In line with the theoretical predictions, we find that ownership matters for the division of the revenue and the investments. However, communication can mitigate Aghion and Tirole's (1994a) concern that the customer will not relinquish ownership to the cash-constrained research unit. (C) 2017 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Inc.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Kusterer, David J. UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0001-8891-4488 UNSPECIFIED Schmitz, Patrick W. UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0003-3461-5102 UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-225580
DOI:	10.1016/j.geb.2017.06.011
Journal or Publication Title:	Games Econ. Behav.
Volume:	104
Page Range:	S. 706 - 726
Date:	2017
Publisher:	ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE
Place of Publication:	SAN DIEGO
ISSN:	1090-2473
Language:	English
Faculty:	Faculty of Management, Economy and Social Sciences
Divisions:	Center of Excellence C-SEB
Subjects:	Economics
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language PROPERTY-RIGHTS; ASSET OWNERSHIP; INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS; VERTICAL INTEGRATION; INVESTMENTS; PROMISES; COSTS Multiple languages Economics Multiple languages
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/22558