Universität zu Köln

Danilov, Anastasia ORCID: 0000-0003-3662-4897 and Sliwka, Dirk ORCID: 0000-0002-8026-0165 (2017). Can Contracts Signal Social Norms? Experimental Evidence. Manage. Sci., 63 (2). S. 459 - 477. CATONSVILLE: INFORMS. ISSN 1526-5501

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Abstract

We investigate whether incentive schemes signal social norms and thus affect behavior beyond their direct economic consequences. A one-shot principal-agent experiment is studied where prior to contract choice principals are informed about the past actions of other agents and thus have more information about norms of behavior. Compared with a setting in which principals are uninformed, agents exert substantially higher effort under a fixed wage contract when they are aware that an informed principal chose this contract. The informed principal's choice apparently signals a norm not to exploit trust, which leads to more trustworthy behavior. This mechanism's robustness is explored in further experiments.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Danilov, Anastasia UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0003-3662-4897 UNSPECIFIED Sliwka, Dirk UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0002-8026-0165 UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-240022
DOI:	10.1287/mnsc.2015.2336
Journal or Publication Title:	Manage. Sci.
Volume:	63
Number:	2
Page Range:	S. 459 - 477
Date:	2017
Publisher:	INFORMS
Place of Publication:	CATONSVILLE
ISSN:	1526-5501
Language:	English
Faculty:	Faculty of Management, Economy and Social Sciences
Divisions:	Center of Excellence C-SEB Faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences > Business Administration > Corporate Development > Professorship for Business Administration and Human Resources Management
Subjects:	Economics
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language HIDDEN COSTS; ECONOMIC EXPERIMENTS; HUMAN COOPERATION; REFERENCE POINTS; INCENTIVES; RECIPROCITY; TRUST; SANCTIONS; UNEMPLOYMENT; PUNISHMENT Multiple languages Management; Operations Research & Management Science Multiple languages
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/24002