Universität zu Köln

Zimmermann, Jarid and Efferson, Charles ORCID: 0000-0001-8244-4497 (2017). One-shot reciprocity under error management is unbiased and fragile. Evol. Hum. Behav., 38 (1). S. 39 - 48. NEW YORK: ELSEVIER SCIENCE INC. ISSN 1879-0607

Full text not available from this repository.

Abstract

The error management model of altruism in one-shot interactions provides an influential explanation for one of the most controversial behaviors in evolutionary social science. The model posits that one-shot altruism arises from a domain-specific cognitive bias that avoids the error of mistaking a long-term relationship for a oneshot interaction. One-shot altruism is thus, in an intriguingly paradoxical way, a form of reciprocity. We examine the logic behind this idea in detail. In its most general form the error management model is exceedingly flexible, and restrictions about the psychology of agents are necessary for selection to be well-defined. Once these restrictions are in place, selection is well defined, but it leads to behavior that is perfectly consistent with an unbiased rational benchmark. Thus, the evolution of one-shot reciprocity does not require an evoked cognitive bias based on repeated interactions and reputation. Moreover, in spite of its flexibility in terms of psychology, the error management model assumes that behavior is exceedingly rigid when individuals face a new interaction partner. Reciprocity can only take the form of tit-for-tat, and individuals cannot adjust their behavior in response to new information about the duration of a relationship. Zefferman (2014) showed that one-shot reciprocity does not reliably evolve if one relaxes the first restriction, and we show that the behavior does not reliably evolve if one relaxes the second restriction. Altogether, these theoretical results on one-shot reciprocity do not square well with experiments showing increased altruism in the presence of payoff-irrelevant stimuli that suggest others are watching. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Zimmermann, Jarid UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Efferson, Charles UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0001-8244-4497 UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-248066
DOI:	10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2016.06.005
Journal or Publication Title:	Evol. Hum. Behav.
Volume:	38
Number:	1
Page Range:	S. 39 - 48
Date:	2017
Publisher:	ELSEVIER SCIENCE INC
Place of Publication:	NEW YORK
ISSN:	1879-0607
Language:	English
Faculty:	Unspecified
Divisions:	Unspecified
Subjects:	no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language PRISONERS-DILEMMA; EVOLUTION; GENEROSITY; UNCERTAINTY; STRATEGIES; GAME; EYES Multiple languages Psychology, Biological; Behavioral Sciences; Social Sciences, Biomedical Multiple languages
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/24806