Universität zu Köln

DeVaro, Jed ORCID: 0000-0003-4849-1489 and Gürtler, Oliver ORCID: 0000-0001-7792-5325 (2016). Strategic Shirking in Promotion Tournaments. J. Law Econ. Organ., 32 (3). S. 620 - 652. CARY: OXFORD UNIV PRESS INC. ISSN 1465-7341

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Abstract

We provide a theoretical analysis of multitask promotion tournaments in which workers increase their promotion chances by under-performing (over-performing) on tasks that are de-emphasized (emphasized) in a promotion rule. In some settings the firm can mitigate such strategic shirking by committing to a promotion rule that requires more balance in the performances across job tasks than would be justified on productivity grounds. The model can explain Putt's Law, which states that competent workers are sometimes passed over for promotion in favor of incompetent ones.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code DeVaro, Jed UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0003-4849-1489 UNSPECIFIED Gürtler, Oliver UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0001-7792-5325 UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-267613
DOI:	10.1093/jleo/ewv019
Journal or Publication Title:	J. Law Econ. Organ.
Volume:	32
Number:	3
Page Range:	S. 620 - 652
Date:	2016
Publisher:	OXFORD UNIV PRESS INC
Place of Publication:	CARY
ISSN:	1465-7341
Language:	English
Faculty:	Faculty of Management, Economy and Social Sciences
Divisions:	Center of Excellence C-SEB Faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences > Economics > Microeconomics, Institutions and markets > Professorship for Economics
Subjects:	Economics
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language HUMAN-CAPITAL ACQUISITION; INTERNAL PROMOTION; PETER PRINCIPLE; CORPORATE TOURNAMENTS; EXTERNAL RECRUITMENT; INCENTIVE CONTRACTS; EMPIRICAL-ANALYSIS; SABOTAGE; COMPENSATION; CONTESTS Multiple languages Economics; Law Multiple languages
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/26761