Universität zu Köln

Czermak, Simon, Feri, Francesco, Glätzle-Rützler, Daniela ORCID: 0000-0002-6678-2418 and Sutter, Matthias ORCID: 0000-0002-6143-8706 (2016). How strategic are children and adolescents? Experimental evidence from normal-form games. J. Econ. Behav. Organ., 128. S. 265 - 286. AMSTERDAM: ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV. ISSN 1879-1751

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Abstract

We examine the strategic sophistication of 196 children and adolescents, aged 10-17 years, in experimental normal-form games. Besides choices, we also elicit first- and second-order beliefs. The share of subjects playing Nash or expecting opponents to play Nash is fairly stable across all age groups. The likelihood of playing best response to own beliefs increases in math skills. Using a mixture model, about 40% of subjects are classified as a strategic type, while the others are non-strategic. The distribution of types is somewhat changing with age. The estimated error rates also show some dependency on age and gender. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Czermak, Simon UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Feri, Francesco UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Glätzle-Rützler, Daniela UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0002-6678-2418 UNSPECIFIED Sutter, Matthias UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0002-6143-8706 UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-268926
DOI:	10.1016/j.jebo.2016.04.004
Journal or Publication Title:	J. Econ. Behav. Organ.
Volume:	128
Page Range:	S. 265 - 286
Date:	2016
Publisher:	ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
Place of Publication:	AMSTERDAM
ISSN:	1879-1751
Language:	English
Faculty:	Faculty of Management, Economy and Social Sciences
Divisions:	Center of Excellence C-SEB
Subjects:	Economics
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language STATED BELIEFS; BEHAVIOR; SOPHISTICATION; EQUILIBRIUM; THINKING; MODELS; ADULTS; PLAY Multiple languages Economics Multiple languages
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/26892