Universität zu Köln

DeVaro, Jed ORCID: 0000-0003-4849-1489 and Gürtler, Oliver ORCID: 0000-0001-7792-5325 (2016). STRATEGIC SHIRKING: A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF MULTITASKING AND SPECIALIZATION. International Economic Review, 57 (2). 507 - 532. HOBOKEN: Wiley. ISSN 1468-2354

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Abstract

We provide a new theory to explain why firms multitask workers instead of specializing them. Workers overperform in tasks they like and underperform in tasks they dislike to favorably influence future job assignments. Anticipating this, firms may find it optimal to commit to future multitasking to induce workers to appropriately allocate effort early in the employment relationship. We show that when the product market is volatile, so that future product prices are uncertain, the firm's ability to credibly commit to a multitasking strategy diminishes. This generates a negative relationship between multitasking and product market volatility, consistent with recent empirical evidence.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code DeVaro, Jed UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0003-4849-1489 UNSPECIFIED Gürtler, Oliver UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0001-7792-5325 UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-277232
DOI:	10.1111/iere.12166
Journal or Publication Title:	International Economic Review
Volume:	57
Number:	2
Page Range:	507 - 532
Date:	2016
Publisher:	Wiley
Place of Publication:	HOBOKEN
ISSN:	1468-2354
Language:	English
Faculty:	Faculty of Management, Economy and Social Sciences
Divisions:	Center of Excellence C-SEB Faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences > Economics > Microeconomics, Institutions and markets > Professorship for Economics
Subjects:	Economics
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language INCENTIVE CONTRACTS; CAREER CONCERNS; JOB ROTATION; COORDINATION; LABOR; DELEGATION; ECONOMICS; DESIGN; CHOICE; WORK English Economics English
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/27723