Bierbrauer, Felix ORCID: 0000-0003-3879-9607 and Boyer, Pierre C.
ORCID: 0000-0002-5495-7380
(2016).
Efficiency, Welfare, and Political Competition*.
Q. J. Econ., 131 (1).
S. 461 - 519.
CARY:
OXFORD UNIV PRESS INC.
ISSN 1531-4650
Abstract
We study political competition in an environment in which voters have private information about their preferences. Our framework covers models of income taxation, public-goods provision, or publicly provided private goods. Politicians are vote-share maximizers. They can propose any policy that is resource-feasible and incentive-compatible. They can also offer special favors to subsets of the electorate. We prove two main results. First, the unique symmetric equilibrium is such that policies are surplus-maximizing and hence first-best Pareto-efficient. Second, there is a surplus-maximizing policy that wins a majority against any welfare-maximizing policy. Thus, in our model, policies that trade off equity and efficiency considerations are politically infeasible.
Item Type: | Journal Article | ||||||||||||
Creators: |
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URN: | urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-285232 | ||||||||||||
DOI: | 10.1093/qje/qjv033 | ||||||||||||
Journal or Publication Title: | Q. J. Econ. | ||||||||||||
Volume: | 131 | ||||||||||||
Number: | 1 | ||||||||||||
Page Range: | S. 461 - 519 | ||||||||||||
Date: | 2016 | ||||||||||||
Publisher: | OXFORD UNIV PRESS INC | ||||||||||||
Place of Publication: | CARY | ||||||||||||
ISSN: | 1531-4650 | ||||||||||||
Language: | English | ||||||||||||
Faculty: | Faculty of Management, Economy and Social Sciences | ||||||||||||
Divisions: | Center of Excellence C-SEB Faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences > Economics > Macroeconomic, Financial and Economic Policy > Professorship for Macroeconomic |
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Subjects: | Economics | ||||||||||||
Uncontrolled Keywords: |
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Refereed: | Yes | ||||||||||||
URI: | http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/28523 |
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