Universität zu Köln

Kusterer, David ORCID: 0000-0001-8891-4488 and Schmitz, Patrick W. ORCID: 0000-0003-3461-5102 (2020). Public goods, property rights, and investment incentives: An experimental investigation. J. Econ. Behav. Organ., 177. S. 514 - 533. AMSTERDAM: ELSEVIER. ISSN 1879-1751

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Abstract

How should ownership rights be allocated in public-good settings? We report data from a laboratory experiment with 480 participants that was designed to test a public-good version of the property rights theory based on incomplete contracting. Consider two parties, one of whom can invest in the provision of a public good. The parties value the public good differently. In the literature it has been argued that more investments will be made if the high-valuation party is the owner, regardless of whether or not this party is the investor. Our experimental results cast some doubts on the robustness of this conclusion. (c) 2020 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Kusterer, David UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0001-8891-4488 UNSPECIFIED Schmitz, Patrick W. UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0003-3461-5102 UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-321648
DOI:	10.1016/j.jebo.2020.06.009
Journal or Publication Title:	J. Econ. Behav. Organ.
Volume:	177
Page Range:	S. 514 - 533
Date:	2020
Publisher:	ELSEVIER
Place of Publication:	AMSTERDAM
ISSN:	1879-1751
Language:	English
Faculty:	Faculty of Management, Economy and Social Sciences
Divisions:	Center of Excellence C-SEB
Subjects:	Economics
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS; PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS; TRANSACTION COSTS; OPTIMAL OWNERSHIP; ASSET OWNERSHIP; INFORMATION; GOVERNMENT; COOPERATION; PUNISHMENT; MANAGEMENT Multiple languages Economics Multiple languages
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/32164