Universität zu Köln

Chowdhury, Subhasish M. ORCID: 0000-0002-8386-9144 and Gürtler, Oliver ORCID: 0000-0001-7792-5325 (2015). Sabotage in contests: a survey. Public Choice, 164 (1-2). 135 - 155. DORDRECHT: SPRINGER. ISSN 1573-7101

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Abstract

A contest is a situation in which individuals expend irretrievable resources to win valuable prize(s). Sabotage is a deliberate and costly act of damaging a rival's likelihood of winning the contest. Sabotage can be observed in, e.g., sports, war, promotion tournaments, and political or marketing campaigns. In this article, we provide a model of, and different perspectives on, such sabotage activities and review the economics literature analyzing the act of sabotage in contests. We discuss the theories and evidence emphasizing the means of sabotage, why sabotage occurs, and the effects of sabotage on individual contestants and on overall welfare, with possible means of reducing sabotage. We note that most sabotage activities are aimed at the ablest contestant, the possibility of sabotage reduces productive effort exerted by the contestants, and sabotage may lessen the effectiveness of public policies, such as affirmative action, or information revelation in contests. We discuss the different policies a designer might use to counteract sabotage. We conclude by pointing out some areas of future research.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Chowdhury, Subhasish M. UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0002-8386-9144 UNSPECIFIED Gürtler, Oliver UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0001-7792-5325 UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-399347
DOI:	10.1007/s11127-015-0264-9
Journal or Publication Title:	Public Choice
Volume:	164
Number:	1-2
Page Range:	135 - 155
Date:	2015
Publisher:	SPRINGER
Place of Publication:	DORDRECHT
ISSN:	1573-7101
Language:	English
Faculty:	Faculty of Management, Economy and Social Sciences
Divisions:	Center of Excellence C-SEB Faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences > Economics > Microeconomics, Institutions and markets > Professorship for Economics
Subjects:	Economics
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language RANK-ORDER TOURNAMENTS; DYNAMIC TOURNAMENTS; COMPETITION; INCENTIVES; TEAMS; PAY; INFORMATION; PUNISHMENT; CONTRACTS; SELECTION English Economics; Political Science English
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/39934