Guetler, Marc and Guetler, Oliver (2014). The interaction of explicit and implicit contracts: A signaling approach. J. Econ. Behav. Organ., 108. S. 135 - 147. AMSTERDAM: ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV. ISSN 1879-1751
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
We analyze the interaction of explicit and implicit contracts in a model with selfish and fair principals. Fair principals are willing to honor implicit agreements, selfish principals are not. We investigate a separating equilibrium in which principals reveal their type through the contract offer to the agent. Explicit and implicit contracts are shown to be substitutes. Since the agent learns the principal's type, a selfish principal must rely on explicit incentives. A fair principal, by contrast, can effectively induce implicit incentives and does not need to use explicit incentives. We also find a strategic complementarity between explicit and implicit incentives. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Item Type: | Journal Article | ||||||||||||
Creators: |
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URN: | urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-421126 | ||||||||||||
DOI: | 10.1016/j.jebo.2014.09.006 | ||||||||||||
Journal or Publication Title: | J. Econ. Behav. Organ. | ||||||||||||
Volume: | 108 | ||||||||||||
Page Range: | S. 135 - 147 | ||||||||||||
Date: | 2014 | ||||||||||||
Publisher: | ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV | ||||||||||||
Place of Publication: | AMSTERDAM | ||||||||||||
ISSN: | 1879-1751 | ||||||||||||
Language: | English | ||||||||||||
Faculty: | Unspecified | ||||||||||||
Divisions: | Unspecified | ||||||||||||
Subjects: | no entry | ||||||||||||
Uncontrolled Keywords: |
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URI: | http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/42112 |
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