Universität zu Köln

Engel, Christoph ORCID: 0000-0001-8513-8532 and Zhurakhovska, Lilia ORCID: 0000-0003-4972-9081 (2014). Conditional cooperation with negative externalities - An experiment. J. Econ. Behav. Organ., 108. S. 252 - 261. AMSTERDAM: ELSEVIER. ISSN 1879-1751

Full text not available from this repository.

Abstract

Empirically, the commons are not as tragic as standard theory predicts. The predominant explanation for this finding is conditional cooperation. Yet many real life situations involve insiders, who are directly affected by a dilemma, and outsiders, who may be harmed if the insiders overcome the dilemma. The quintessential illustration is oligopoly. If insiders overcome their dilemma and collude, this inflicts harm on the opposite market side. In our experiment, harm on outsiders significantly reduces conditional cooperation of insiders. We can exclude that this result is driven by inequity aversion, reciprocity or efficiency seeking. Only guilt aversion can rationalize our findings, with guilt being most pronounced if the active insiders not only inflict harm on the outsider, but increase their own payoff at the expense of the outsider. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Engel, Christoph UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0001-8513-8532 UNSPECIFIED Zhurakhovska, Lilia UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0003-4972-9081 UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-422577
DOI:	10.1016/j.jebo.2014.10.005
Journal or Publication Title:	J. Econ. Behav. Organ.
Volume:	108
Page Range:	S. 252 - 261
Date:	2014
Publisher:	ELSEVIER
Place of Publication:	AMSTERDAM
ISSN:	1879-1751
Language:	English
Faculty:	Unspecified
Divisions:	Unspecified
Subjects:	no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language RATIONAL COOPERATION; FAIRNESS; PREFERENCES; RECIPROCITY; AVERSION; EQUITY Multiple languages Economics Multiple languages
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/42257