Universität zu Köln

Grundmann, Thomas and Horvath, Joachim ORCID: 0000-0003-2713-5135 (2014). Thought experiments and the problem of deviant realizations. Philos. Stud., 170 (3). S. 525 - 534. DORDRECHT: SPRINGER. ISSN 1573-0883

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Abstract

Descriptions of Gettier cases can be interpreted in ways that are incompatible with the standard judgment that they are cases of justified true belief without knowledge. Timothy Williamson claims that this problem cannot be avoided by adding further stipulations to the case descriptions. To the contrary, we argue that there is a fairly simple way to amend the Ford case, a standard description of a Gettier case, in such a manner that all deviant interpretations are ruled out. This removes one major objection to interpreting our judgments about Gettier cases as strict conditionals.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Grundmann, Thomas UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Horvath, Joachim UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0003-2713-5135 UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-430767
DOI:	10.1007/s11098-013-0226-3
Journal or Publication Title:	Philos. Stud.
Volume:	170
Number:	3
Page Range:	S. 525 - 534
Date:	2014
Publisher:	SPRINGER
Place of Publication:	DORDRECHT
ISSN:	1573-0883
Language:	English
Faculty:	Faculty of Arts and Humanities
Divisions:	Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Fächergruppe 8: Philosophie > Philosophisches Seminar
Subjects:	no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language Philosophy Multiple languages
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/43076