Schmitz, Patrick W. (2012). The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability. Econ. Lett., 117 (3). S. 841 - 844. LAUSANNE: ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA. ISSN 0165-1765
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
An inventor can invest research effort to come up with an innovation. Once an innovation is made, a contract is negotiated and unobservable effort must be exerted to develop a product. In the absence of liability constraints, the inventor's investment incentives are increasing in his bargaining power. Yet, given limited liability, overinvestments may occur and the inventor's investment incentives may be decreasing in his bargaining power. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Item Type: | Journal Article | ||||||||
Creators: |
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URN: | urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-477440 | ||||||||
DOI: | 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.08.046 | ||||||||
Journal or Publication Title: | Econ. Lett. | ||||||||
Volume: | 117 | ||||||||
Number: | 3 | ||||||||
Page Range: | S. 841 - 844 | ||||||||
Date: | 2012 | ||||||||
Publisher: | ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA | ||||||||
Place of Publication: | LAUSANNE | ||||||||
ISSN: | 0165-1765 | ||||||||
Language: | English | ||||||||
Faculty: | Unspecified | ||||||||
Divisions: | Unspecified | ||||||||
Subjects: | no entry | ||||||||
Uncontrolled Keywords: |
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URI: | http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/47744 |
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